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Abstract. This article provides empirical support for the hypothesis that different 
exchange rate regimes have an impact on inflation in advanced, emerging and developing 
countries. The effects of different exchange rate regimes on inflation performance are 
examined through least squares dummy variables regressions using panel data on 125 
countries for the post-Bretton Woods (1974-1999) period. Also, this article addresses the 
issue of measurement errors in the classification of exchange rate regimes by using four 
different classification schemes. Three de facto and one de jure classifications are used. 
Consequently, the sensitivity of these results to alternative exchange rate classifications is 
also tested. The empirical findings indicate that countries with fixed regimes tend to have 
a lower inflation rate compared to floating and intermediate exchange rate regimes, 
particularly in emerging and developing countries. 
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1. Introduction 
ince the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system, adopting a correct 
exchange rate regime that contributes to low inflation and encourages 
economic growth, has been a great challenge. A wide variety of exchange 
rate regimes, ranging from completely flexible to completely fixed (with a wide 
range of intermediate systems) have been adopted by different countries. The 
debate over fixed, intermediate and floating exchange rate arrangements has once 
again taken centre stage in academic circles. Some economists maintain that the 
first round of this debate was won by those advocating for floating arrangements 
because all crisis episodes took place in countries that had adopted a variety of 
mechanisms for pegging their exchange regimes. Conversely, advocates of fixed 
exchange rate regimes suggest that there are bad fixes and good fixes (like 
official dollarization) and good or truly fixed arrangements that allow countries to 
achieve credibility and lower inflation. 
An important recent development in the debate over optimal exchange rate 
regimes is the recognition that the choice of an exchange rate arrangement is 
different between particular groups of countries. The choice of an exchange rate 
regime for developed countries is different from that of developing countries or 
emerging market economies. Developing countries are often beset by a lack of 
credibility and limited access to international capital markets. Hence, fixed 
exchange rate regimes play a useful role by providing policymakers with a 
nominal anchor for monetary policy and by helping to establish a degree of policy 
credibility. In contrast, emerging market economies are more integrated with 
global financial markets, but have encountered more currency crises under 
pegged exchange rate arrangements (Husain et al., 2005). Developed countries 
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have obtained more benefits from flexible exchange rate regimes because they are 
more developed economically and institutionally, and more integrated with global 
financial markets (Rogoff et al., 2003). 
Contrary to a large number of theoretical studies in the literature, relatively 
few studies attempt to empirically investigate the impact of an exchange rate 
regime on inflation performance in developed, emerging and developing 
countries, separately. This is perhaps because such an empirical investigation is 
fraught with difficulties, including the problem concerning the classification of 
the exchange rate arrangement. This article addresses the issue of measurement 
errors in the classification of exchange rate regimes by using four different 
classification schemes. Three de facto and one de jure classifications are used. 
Consequently, the sensitivity of these results to alternative exchange rate 
classifications is also tested. The principal conclusion emerging from this study is 
the following: fixed exchange rate arrangements deliver lower inflation 
particularly in emerging and developing countries. This result supports those 
views arguing that the credibility associated with fixed regimes helps policy-
makers achieve lower inflation outcomes.  
The remainder of this article is organised as follows: Section 2 presents a brief 
literature review focusing on exchange rate arrangement classifications and on 
the link between exchange rate regimes and inflation. Section 3 describes the 
empirical framework. A preliminary analysis of the data is presented in Section 4. 
Section 5 reports empirical findings. Section 6 concludes the findings of this 
article. 
 
2. Exchange Rate Regimes and Inflation: A Survey of the 
Literature 
This literature review section is broken down into two sub-sections. The first 
sub-section presents a brief discussion on the different approaches, considered in 
this study, to exchange rate regime classification. The second sub-section 
presents a review of empirical analyses of exchange rate arrangements and 
inflation performance.  
 
2.1. Regime Classification 
A common problem in the empirical analysis of exchange rate systems is 
regime classification. The literature identifies two approaches to this problem: the 
de jure classification and the de facto classification. The first approach classifies 
countries by what they say they do (de jure). However, countries often act 
differently than what they declare they do. In particular, a self-declared 
independent floating regime, in reality, often operates as a managed peg regime. 
This phenomenon of operating a disguised peg is referred to as "fear of floating" 
(Calvo & Reinhart, 2002). On the other hand, classifying countries by what they 
actually do is known as a de facto classification. Some authors develop de facto 
classifications using various methods (Ghosh et al., 1997; Bailliu et al., 2001; 
Moreno, 2001; Poirson, 2002; Bubula & Otker-Rober, 2002; Reinhart & Rogoff, 
2004; Shambaugh, 2004; Garofalo, 2005; Dubas et al., 2005; Levy-Yeyati & 
Sturzenergger, 2005; Bérnassy-Quéré et al., 2006; Frankel & Wei, 2008; Klein & 
Shambaugh, 2008; Ilzetski et al., 2010), but these are fundamentally based on 
data on the behaviour of nominal exchange rates, international reserves and 
interest rates1. 
Some empirical studies simply employ the de facto classification because the 
de jure classification may reach incorrect results2, particularly about floating 
 
1 For a literature review on why many countries follow de facto regimes different from their de jure 
regimes see Cruz-Rodríguez (2013). 
2 This could be the result of measurement error in the classification of exchange rate arrangements. 
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regimes. Some research, however, employs the de jure classification arguing that 
it suffers from less drawbacks than the de facto classification3. 
In this article, we employ a combination of three de facto and one de jure 
classifications. Firstly, we use the de facto classification developed by Levy-
Yeyati & Sturzenergger (2005), henceforth referred to as the "LYS 
classification". These authors apply a cluster analysis to a data set with three 
variables: changes in the nominal exchange rate, the volatility of these changes, 
and the volatility of international reserves from all IMF reporting countries during 
the period 1974-2000. Secondly, the "natural classification" developed by 
Reinhart & Rogoff (2004) is employed. Reinhart & Rogoff (2004) reclassified 
exchange rate regimes based on market-determined dual and parallel exchange 
rates, and use official rates only if the exchange rates are unified4. These authors 
examine the chronologies of the exchange rate history for 153 countries during 
the period 1946-2001. They are able to distinguish between floating by high 
inflation countries (freely falling) from floating by others. They define the 
category of "freely falling" rates when the 12-month rate of inflation exceeds 
40% and when, during these periods of high inflation, there is no official 
announcement of the regime by the authorities5. In addition, they define hyper 
floats as those episodes of macroeconomic instability that are characterised by 
hyperinflation where the monthly inflation rate is 50% or more. Thirdly, an 
alternative classification scheme developed by Bailliu et al., (2001) is used. These 
authors develop a Hybrid Mechanical Rule (HMR) classification. This system 
classifies exchange rate regimes in terms of their observed flexibility and takes 
into account external shocks and revaluations. Their analysis is based on a sample 
of 60 countries for the period 1973-1998. Finally, the de jure classification from 
the IMF is used6. 
In our analysis, all the different classifications are grouped into three broader 
regimes: fixed, intermediate and floating exchange rate regimes (see Table 1). 
Managed floating is classified under the floating category because managed, in 
the context of the Reinhart-Rogoff classification, does not necessarily imply 
active or frequent foreign exchange market intervention.  
 
Table 1. Classification of Exchange Rate Regime 
Fixed Intermediate Floating 
De facto Classification by Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenerger 
(1) Fixed (2) Crawling peg 
(3) Dirty floats 
(4) Float 
De facto Classification by Reinhart and Rogoff 
(1) No separate legal tender 
(2) Pre-announced peg or currency 
board arrangement 
(3) Pre-announced horizontal band 
that is narrower than or equal to ± 
2% 
(4) De facto peg 
(5) Pre-announced crawling peg 
(6) Pre-announced crawling band that is 
narrower than or equal to ± 2% 
(7) De facto crawling peg 
(8) De facto crawling band that is narrower 
than or equal to ± 2% 
(9) Pre-announced crawling band that is 
wide than or equal ± 2% 
(10) De facto crawling band that is 
narrower than or equal to ± 5% 
(11) Moving band that is narrower than or 
equal to ± 2%   
(12) Managed floating 
(13) Freely floating 
(14) Freely falling 
(15) Hyper floating 
De facto Classification by Bailliu, Lafrance and Perrault 
 
3 The de facto classification has the advantage of being based on observable behaviour, but it does 
not capture the distinction between stable nominal exchange rates resulting from the absence of 
shocks, and stability that stems from policy actions offsetting shocks. More importantly, it fails to 
reflect the commitment of the central bank to intervene in the foreign exchange market. Although 
the de jure classification captures this formal commitment, it falls short of capturing policies 
inconsistent with the commitment, which lead to a collapse or frequent adjustments of the parity. 
4 In the case where there are no dual or multiples rates or parallel markets are not active. 
5 In situations where the currency crisis marks a sudden transition from a fixed or quasi-fixed 
regime to a managed or independently floating regime, they label an exchange rate as freely 
falling during the six months immediately following a currency crisis. 
6 The data on the de jure classification of exchange rate regimes is taken from Ghosh et al., (2002) 
and from the IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions. 
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(1) Currency boards 
(2) Single currency peg 
(3) Basket pegs 
(4) Crawling pegs with narrow 
bands 
(5) Flexibility index ≤ 1 
 
(6) Flexibility index ≥ 1 
 
De jure Classification by Ghosh, Gulde and Wolf 
(1) Pegged regimes (2) Intermediate regimes (4) Floating regimes 
Note: Inconclusive classifications from Levy-Yeyati & Sturzenergger are not considered in our 
analysis.  
Sources: Bailliu et al., (2001); Bailliu et al., (2003); Ghosh et al., (2002); Reinhart & Rogoff 
(2004); and Levy-Yeyati & Sturzenergger (2005). 
 
2.2. Exchange Rate Arrangements and Inflation 
Theoretical and empirical literature on exchange rate arrangements and 
inflation suggests that countries using fixed exchange rate regimes and consistent 
macro policies tend to have lower and more stable rates of inflation. The 
explanation for this is simply that a fixed exchange rate provides a credible 
nominal anchor for monetary policy7 and for the evolution of the price level. 
Fixed rates also provide a visible commitment, thereby raising the political costs 
of excessive monetary growth. A credible peg is likely to engender a more robust 
demand for money, which reduces the inflationary consequences of a given 
monetary expansion. In this order, the empirical work of Ghosh et al., (1997) 
shows that inflation under fixed exchange rate regimes is significantly lower than 
under intermediate or freely floating arrangements. Similarly, Ghosh et al., 
(2002) find a positive association between the degree of nominal exchange rate 
regime flexibility and inflation, even after controlling for the effects of money 
growth. 
On the other hand, Levy-Yeyati & Sturzenegger (2001) investigate the impact 
of exchange rate regimes on inflation, nominal money growth, real interest rates, 
and GDP growth. These authors show that, for non-industrial economies, “long” 
(lasting five years or more) pegs are associated with lower inflation than floats, 
but at the cost of slower GDP growth. Additionally, Moreno (2001), using his 
own de facto classification, examines how pegging is associated with inflation 
and output in a sample of 98 developing and emerging market economies for the 
period 1974-1998. His results show that a pegged exchange rate is associated 
with lower inflation. While, Domac et al., (2001), using de jure classification 
provided by the IMF, examine whether the exchange rate regime has any impact 
on inflation and growth performance in 22 transition economies for the period 
1991-1998. Their findings indicate that transition countries with intermediate 
arrangements may achieve lower inflation if they were to adopt a fixed regime. 
The results also suggest that switching from a floating regime to an intermediate 
arrangement may not deliver lower inflation. Similar results were found by 
Domac et al., (2003). Theses authors empirically investigate the link between the 
exchange rate regime and inflation performance in transition economies. Their 
results suggest that fixed exchange rate regimes tend to deliver lower and more 
stable rates of inflation. 
Rogoff et al., (2003) re-examine the link between exchange rate regimes and 
economic performance across four dimensions: inflation, output growth, growth 
volatility, and the incidence of crises. Their results suggest that, for countries at a 
relatively early stage of financial development and integration, fixed or relatively 
rigid regimes appear to offer some anti-inflation credibility gain without 
compromising growth objectives. On the contrary, for developed countries that 
 
7 One advantage of fixing the exchange rate in terms of a particular major currency like the U.S. 
dollar is the provision of a nominal anchor to prevent inflationary monetary policies. This means 
that, over time, domestic price and inflation levels will converge with those of the foreign 
country. In many developing countries, fixed exchange rates have provided a nominal anchor for 
so long because domestic anchors cannot be achieved due to a lack of institutional development, 
experience and stability. They rely on the fixed exchange rate for its clarity and understanding, as 
well as view it as a sign of commitment from policymakers. 
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are not in a currency union, relatively flexible exchange rate regimes appear to 
offer higher GDP growth without any cost on credibility. In the same way, 
Husain et al., (2005), using the de facto classification from Reinhart & Rogoff 
(2004), find that for developing countries with little exposure to international 
capital markets, pegs are notable for their durability and relatively low inflation. 
Similarly, De Grauwe & Schnabl (2005) analyse the impact of the exchange rate 
regime on inflation and output in South Eastern and Central Europe for the period 
1994-2004. Their results reveal a significant impact of fixed exchange rates on 
low inflation. Also, Coudert & Dubert (2005) analyse interesting aspects of the de 
facto regimes followed by major Asian countries over the period 1990-2001. 
Their results show that fixed exchange rate regimes are associated with better 
performances in terms of inflation. While Garofalo (2005), using his de facto 
classification, examines the influence of different exchange rate policies on the 
Italy’s economic performance for the period 1861-1998. His results show that 
inflation performance is apparently better under the gold standard (pegged) than 
under other regimes. 
In the same way, Bleaney & Francisco (2007) examine the relationship 
between exchange rate, inflation and growth in 91 developing countries over the 
period 1984-2001. They distinguish between three exchange rate regime 
categories: floats, easily adjustable peg (soft peg) and those where adjustment is 
harder (hard pegs, defined by the use of a shared currency or a currency board 
system). Their results suggest that floats have growth rates similar to soft pegs 
and only slightly higher inflation; while hard pegs have lower inflation and 
slower GDP growth than other regimes. Similarly, Klein & Shambaugh (2010), 
using the classification scheme from Klein & Shambaugh (2008), study the links 
between the exchange rate regimen and inflation performance based on a data set 
representing the experience of 80 countries (22 industrial and 58 nonindustrial) 
over the period 1980-1999. They find evidence that a peg affects inflation both 
through a disciplinary role and credibility role. These authors also find that the 
peg affects average inflation rates over this entire period by disciplining the 
monetary policy of nonindustrial countries, but it does not have a similarly 
significant role for industrial economies. On the contrary, Rose (2011) using the 
data span of 178 economies from 1974 through 2007 and four methodologies to 
exchange classification (the official IMF; Reinhart & Rogoff, 2004; Shambaugh, 
2004 and Levy-Yeyati & Sturzenergger, 2005), evaluates the effect of exchange 
regime on inflation. His results indicate that there is no clear relationship between 
inflation and the exchange rate regime that spans all countries. 
Ghanem (2012) empirically assesses the relationship between exchange rate 
regimes and inflation performance for 17 MENA countries over the period 1980-
2007. Using the de jure IMF and the de facto regimes of Reinhart & Rogoff 
(2004) and Levy-Yeyati & Sturzenegger (2005), and controlling for 
macroeconomic variables that are conventionally associated with inflation, he 
finds that a de jure fixed exchange rate regime alone does not contribute to a 
lower inflation rate, while credible pegs were associated with lower inflation. The 
author identifies credible regimes by matching what is announced and what is 
observed. Also, when considering de facto peg regimes, hefinds that they are 
strongly associated with lower inflation. Moreover, Toulaboe & Terry (2013) 
investigate the link between exchange rate regimes and inflation performance in 
developing countries, using pooled annual data for the period 1985-2006. Based 
on the de facto classification obtained by using different methodologies to assess 
the volatility of the observed nominal effective exchange rates, their results 
suggest that flexible exchange rate regimes are more inflationarythan pegged 
exchange rate regimes. Also, Mohantya & Bhanumurthyb (2014) examine the 
impact of the de facto stable exchange rate regime on inflation in India during 
1994-2011. The authors divide the sample into different sub-periods of exchange 
rate stability. Their results show that the impact of exchange rate regime on 
inflation is not visible in the Indian case which could be due to the offsetting 
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sterilization policy undertaken by the India’s central bank during expansionary 
money supply growth resulting from its large-scale intervention to even out 
exchange rate volatility. Similarly, Lohi (2014), usingthe IMF de facto 
classification8 and a sample of 36 Sub-Saharan countries over 1980-2007, study 
whether the fixed exchange rate regime provides lower inflation. His empirical 
results show that countries with a fixed exchange rate exhibit lower inflation, but 
support the inflation-growth trade off. In the same way, Sosvilla-Rivero (2014) 
and Ramos-Herrera (2014) analyse the relationship between exchange-rate 
regimes and inflation performance in 123 economies, both developed and 
developing, for the period 1970-2010. The authors use the de facto classification 
from Ilzetski et al., (2010). Their results suggest that those countries with flexible 
exchange-rate regimes are characterized by higher inflation rates, while the 
smaller inflation rates are associated with fixed exchange rates and countries with 
intermediate regimes occupy anintermediate position in their records of inflation 
rates.On the other hand, Ghosh et al., (2014), based on a novel data set of the 
IMF’ sde jure and de facto exchange rate regime classifications (Reinhart & 
Rogoff, 2004; Shambaugh, 2004 and Levy-Yeyati & Sturzenergger, 2005) for 
146 emerging and developing economies over 1980–2010, find that inflation is 
indeed lower, especially in emerging markets, by some four percentage points 
when the central bank both de jure commits and de facto pegs the exchange rate 
than when it de facto pegs alone. 
 
3. Empirical Methodology 
A panel data model is used to estimate the impact of exchange rate regimes on 
inflation. The model used is Least Squares Dummy Variables (LSDV) as applied 
to a static panel dataset. The following equation describes the general 
specification used: 
 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝑋𝑖𝑡𝛽 + 𝐷𝑖𝛼𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                                                       (1) 
 
where i =1,2.....N,  t = 1,2....T, yit is the dependent variable in country i and 
time t,  Xit is the vector of inputs for the ith variables in the t th period,  Di  is a 
dummy variable,  αi is a country specific effect, and εit is an error term. We also 
assume εit ~ (0, σ
2).  
The country specific effect, αi, is designed to capture the determinants of a 
country's inflation rate that are not already controlled by the other explanatory 
variables. It thus accounts for unobservable characteristics that vary across 
countries but not over time. The country specific effect could be either a fixed 
effect (i.e., a constant that varies for each cross-sectional unit), or a random effect 
(i.e., a random variable drawn from a common distribution with a mean α and a 
variance σ2). We use a Hausman test to decide whether it is more appropriate to 
model the country-specific effects as being fixed or random9. 
We employ a panel data estimating method to determine the impact of the 
exchange rate arrangement on inflation. The dependent variable is inflation 
scaled, which is a measure robust to hyperinflationary outlier countries. To 
 
8 Critics constantly moved away from the official International Monetary Fund classification to 
construct a de facto classification system in 1999. The new IMF classification combines the 
available information on exchange rates and monetary policy frameworks, and the formal or 
informal policy intentions of authorities, with data on actual exchange rates and reserve 
movements to reach an assessment of the actual exchange rate regime (Habermeier et al., 2009, 
provide information on revisions to this classification system in early 2009). However, it can be 
argued that the new IMF classification system is still one of the de jure regimes, since it still relies 
heavily on official information and looks mainly at the behaviour of official exchange rates 
(Reinhart & Rogoff, 2004). 
9 The null hypothesis of the Hausman test in this context states that there is no correlation between 
country-specific effects and explanatory variables. Rejection of the null hypothesis indicates that 
modelling country-specific effects as being fixed is more appropriate. 
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ascertain that our results are robust to the regime classifications, we employ both 
de jure and de facto classifications in this article. We also use three different de 
facto classifications. 
 
4. The Data 
The sample consists of panel data for 125 countries classified by the World 
Bank according to their income. Advanced countries are those economies 
classified as upper income countries. Emerging market countries are defined 
according to the Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI) index10 at that 
moment. The rest of the countries are designated as developing. Table 2 provides 
a list of countries classified in each group. 
The dataset is annual, spanning from 1974 through to 1999. Data availability 
differs across countries, particularly for East-European countries which start from 
the 1990s. As a consequence, our panel data set is unbalanced. 
 
Table 2. List of Countries 
Advanced 
Countries 
Emerging  
Markets 
Developing  
Countries 
Australia 
Austria 
Belgium 
Canada 
Cyprus 
Denmark 
Finland 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
Iceland 
Ireland 
Italy 
Japan 
Kuwait 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Norway 
Portugal 
Singapore 
Slovenia 
Spain 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
United 
Kingdom 
United States 
Argentina 
Brazil 
Chile 
China 
Colombia 
CzechRepublic 
Egypt 
Hungary 
India 
Indonesia 
Israel 
Jordan 
Korea, Rep. 
Malaysia 
Mexico 
Morocco 
Pakistan 
Peru 
Philippines 
Poland 
Rusia 
South Africa 
Thailand 
Turkey 
Venezuela 
Algeria 
Antigua & 
Barbuda 
Benin 
Bolivia 
Botswana 
Burkina Faso 
Burundi 
Cameron 
Chad 
Congo, Rep. of 
Costa Rica 
Croatia 
Dominica 
Dominican Rep. 
Ecuador 
El Salvador 
Equatorial 
Guinea 
Estonia 
Gabon 
Gambia, the 
Georgia 
Ghana 
Grenada 
Guatemala 
Guinea-Bissau 
Guyana 
Haiti 
Honduras 
Ivory Coast 
Jamaica 
Kazahstan 
Kenya 
Kyrgyz Rep. 
Lao Dem. Rep. 
Latvia 
Lebanon 
Lesotho 
Liberia 
Libya 
Lithuania 
Macedonia 
Madagascar 
Malawi 
Mali 
Malta 
Mauritius 
Moldova 
Mongolia 
Myanmar 
Nepal 
New Zealand 
Nicaragua 
Niger 
Nigeria 
Panama 
Paraguay 
Romania 
Saudi Arabia 
Senegal 
Slovak Rep. 
Sri Lanka 
St. Lucia 
St. Kitt& Nevis 
St. Vicent& 
Grenadines 
Suriname 
Swaziland 
Tanzania 
Togo 
Tunisia 
Uganda 
Ukraine 
Uruguay 
Zambia 
Zimbabwe 
Note: Emerging market economies are those included in the Morgan Stanley Capital International 
(MSCI) index. Advanced economies are those classified as upper income economies by the World 
Bank, with the exception of Israel, which is in an emerging market. The remaining countries were 
designated as developing countries. 
 
Most of the macroeconomic and financial variables used in our analysis are 
taken from the World Bank's World Development Indicators and the IMF's World 
Economic Outlook databases. A few series are taken from the CD-ROM version 
of the International Monetary Fund's International Financial Statistic (IFS). The 
data from the de jure IMF classification can be obtained from the IMF’s Annual 
Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions and Ghosh et al., 
(2002). The central bank turnover rate, which is the number of central bank 
governors per five-year period, used as a proxy for aversion to inflation, is taken 
from Ghosh et al., (2002) and the Cukierman-Webb central bank database. 
 
10 The MSCI index classifies a country into an emerging market in line with a number of factors 
relating to international capital market access. 
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Table 3. List of variables used in the estimations 
Variable Description 
Gov. Balance 
Money 
Real GDP 
Openness 
CB turnover 
TT growth 
Floating 
Intermediate 
Central government balance (% of GDP) 
Broad money growth (% per year) 
Real GDP growth (%) 
Exports plus imports of goods and services (% GDP) 
Central Bank turnover rate (per 5 years) 
Terms of trade growth (%) 
Dummy variable capturing floating exchange rate regimes 
Dummy variable capturing intermediate arrangements 
Notes: The table does not include the dependent variables, which are explained in the text. 
Variables expressed in US dollars were converted to the natural logarithmic scale for estimation 
purposes. 
 
The variables used in this analysis and their descriptions are listed in Table 3. 
These variables were selected on the basis of previous theoretical and empirical 
literature. Government balance is defined as current revenue, capital revenue and 
official grants received, less total expenditure and lending minus repayments. 
This variable considers central governments only. Money and quasi money are 
defined as the sum of currency outside banks, demand deposits other than those 
of the central government, and the time, savings and foreign currency deposits of 
resident sectors other than the central government. This definition of money 
supply is frequently called M2. Variables expressed in US dollar were converted 
to the natural logarithmic scale. The rest of variables were expressed in 
percentage. Finally, floating and intermediate exchange rate regimes are 
identified with a dummy variable that takes the value of one if these regimes 
prevail in a country during a particular year.  
 
5. Estimation Results 
This section presents the results of regressions for the Least Squares Dummy 
Variables (LSDV). The LSDV models were estimated using an unbalanced panel 
with robust standard errors. In estimating inflation, following Ghosh et al., 
(1997), we transform the inflation rate by calculating a scaled measure, 
𝜋
𝜋+1
 , to 
avoid the bias caused by some cases of very high inflation without deleting them 
from the sample. 
To examine the relationship between exchange rate arrangements and inflation 
we regress the scaled inflation (henceforth inflation) on two exchange rate system 
dummies for floating and intermediate rate regimes. The dummy takes the value 
one if a floating or intermediate exchange rate regime prevails in a country during 
a particular year; otherwise, it takes the value of zero. Fixed exchange rate 
regimes are the excluded category. Hence, the coefficients on floating and 
intermediate regimes should be interpreted as the inflation differential relative to 
a fixed exchange rate arrangement. The independent variables are broad money 
growth, real per capita GDP growth, trade openness, central bank governor 
turnover rate, terms of trade growth and government balance. Faster money 
growth is associated with high inflation (by raising money supply), while higher 
real GDP growth should reduce inflation (by increasing money demand). 
Similarly, we expect a negative sign in the trade openness coefficient because 
greater trade openness increases the cost of a monetary expansion, which should 
imply lower inflation in more open economies11. 
 
11 If a country opens up to trade, the incentive to inflate diminishes because if the price index that 
monetary authorities seek to stabilise includes foreign goods, real currency depreciation 
exacerbates the inflation cost of a monetary expansion. Romer (1993) tests the proposition that 
more open economies have lower inflation rates. He finds that more open countries indeed appear 
to have lower inflation, and generally finds this conclusion to be quite robust. 
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The central bank governor turnover rate is a proxy for central bank 
independence12. A higher turnover rate of the central bank governor should be 
associated with higher inflation. Also, we include terms of trade growth because 
it contributes to aggregate demand pressures. The government balance (fiscal 
balance) is closely related to inflation. If the government balance is negative 
(fiscal deficit), the need to finance this fiscal deficit can lead to an excessive 
growth in money supply, which causes inflation. 
As shown by Table 4, the null hypothesis of the Hausman test (no correlation 
between the country effects and the explanatory variables) is rejected at a 5% 
level in most cases and at a 10% level in emerging countries with the LYS de 
facto classification. As a consequence, we use the fixed effects model except in 
emerging countries with the HMR de facto schemes, because the Hausman 
specification test suggests that it is more appropriate to model the country effects 
as random rather than fixed in this case.  
 
Table 4. Hausman Specification Test 
Classification All Countries Advanced Emerging Developing 
Natural          χ2 (8) = 64.5(0.00) χ2 (8) = 83.8(0.00) χ2 (8) = 14.4(0.03) χ2 (8) = 66.4(0.00) 
LYS      χ2 (8) = 71.4(0.00)  χ2(8) = 185.3(0.00) χ2 (8) = 15.5(0.05) χ2(8) = 145.1(0.00) 
HMR            χ2 (8) = 44.7(0.00)  χ2(8) = 61.2(0.00) χ2 (8) = 11.3(0.19) χ2(8) = 42.9(0.00) 
De Jure          χ2 (8) = 29.4(0.00)  χ2(8) = 210.9(0.00)  χ2 (8) = 17.5(0.03)  χ2(8) = 102.2(0.00) 
Source: Author's calculations. 
 
Tables 5 and 6 report the impact of exchange arrangements on inflation in all 
countries and advanced economies, and in emerging and developing countries, 
respectively. As indicated by the adjusted R2, the model explains between 75 and 
87 per cent of the variation in inflation rates observed in our sample.  
The sign of the coefficients associated to the explanatory variables are 
generally statistically significant and consistent with theory. Money growth 
shows a positive sign in all estimations (not always statistically significant). 
While real GDP growth shows a negative sign, as expected. Similarly, the 
openness variable shows a negative sign, so that a more open economy has less 
inflation 13 . The central bank turnover rate shows a positive association with 
inflation in almost all samples. However, when we estimate the inflation equation 
in advanced economies this variable shows a negative and statistically significant 
relationship with inflation (except in the LYS scheme, but it is statistically 
insignificant). This negative relationship may capture the fact that these countries 
are more developed institutionally. Conversely, the central bank turnover rate 
shows a positive association with inflation in emerging and developing countries. 
Terms of trade growth shows a negative sign in all, advanced and developing 
countries, but it shows a positive sign in emerging economies (not statistically 
significant). Finally, the government balance (fiscal balance) displays a negative 
sign in most cases, but usually this variable is not statistically significant. In 
general, these results suggest that higher real GDP growth and trade openness 
reduces inflation, while faster money growth and central bank governor turnover 
rates increase inflation, as was expected. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
12 According to the literature on policy credibility, an independent central bank can help solve the 
time-inconsistency problem. Hence, if central banks are less independent, governors can befired 
more easily (Cukierman et al., 1992). 
13 These results are interesting because openness is a traditional variable in the Optimal Currency 
Area (OCA) theory. An increase in trade openness makes a country more likely to adopt a fixed 
regime, as opposed to an intermediate or floating regime. 
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Table 5. The Impact of Exchange Rate Regimes on Inflation in All Countries and 
Advanced Economies 
 All Countries Advanced Economies 
Natural LYS HMR De jure Natural LYS HMR De jure 
Constant 0.18 
(8.75)* 
0.15 
(7.92)* 
0.17 
(12.92)* 
0.19 
(9.62)* 
0.15 
(7.61)* 
0.14 
(8.01)* 
0.15 
(7.65)* 
0.15 
(7.97)* 
Money 7.14e-05 
(1.16) 
7.07e-05 
(1.40) 
0.04 
(4.76)# 
7.78e-05 
(1.32) 
0.14 
(3.16)* 
0.06 
(2.26)# 
0.14 
(3.06)* 
0.13 
(3.18)* 
Real GDP -0.51 
(-4.03)* 
-0.35 
(-3.61)* 
-0.41 
(-3.01)* 
-0.52 
(-3.75)* 
-0.13 
(-1.30) 
-0.15 
(-1.65)^ 
-0.22 
(-1.91)# 
-0.14 
(-1.53) 
Openness -0.13 
(-6.69)* 
-0.10 
(-5.00)* 
-0.12 
(-7.39)* 
-0.12 
(-6.27)* 
-0.18 
(-7.40)* 
-0.17 
(-7.39)* 
-0.19 
(-7.34)* 
-0.18 
(-7.59)* 
CB turnover 0.10 
(7.23)* 
0.12 
(7.12)* 
0.02 
(1.30) 
0.10 
(6.69)* 
-0.51 
(-4.27)* 
0.02 
(1.07) 
-0.06 
(-4.13)* 
-0.05 
(-3.74)* 
TT growth -0.002 
(-0.13) 
0.02 
(0.76) 
-0.04 
(-1.48) 
-0.01 
(-0.29) 
-0.11 
(-2.75)* 
-0.08 
(-2.08)# 
-0.10 
(-2.72)* 
-0.11 
(-2.52)# 
Gov. balance -0.04 
(-0.44) 
-0.10 
(-1.12) 
-0.06 
(-0.80) 
-0.13 
(-1.55) 
-0.04 
(-0.87) 
0.01 
(0.20) 
-0.04 
(-0.78) 
-0.04 
(-0.86) 
Floating 0.10 
(9.62)* 
0.04 
(5.90)* 
0.04 
(2.58)* 
0.02 
(1.52) 
-0.001 
(-0.13) 
0.01 
(0.92) 
0.003 
(0.51) 
-0.01 
(-2.33)# 
Intermediate 0.004 
(0.50) 
0.09 
(7.56)* 
0.02 
(2.86)# 
0.03 
(2.35)# 
0.001 
(0.13) 
0.014 
(1.91)^ 
0.01 
(2.31)# 
0.02 
(4.08)* 
Observations 1806 1442 1147 1778 562 445 486 582 
F-test prob. 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Adj. R2 0.77 0.78 0.83 0.75 0.82 0.87 0.82 0.82 
Notes: The table reports the least squares dummy variables results of unbalanced panels with fixed 
effects. Dependent variable is inflation. The standard errors of the estimates are robust to cross 
contemporaneous correlation.  t -statistics are displayed in parenthesis. (*) denotes significance at 
the 1% level, (#) at the 5% level and (^) at the 10% level. 
Source: Author's estimates. 
 
Table 6. The Impact of Exchange Rate Regimes on Inflationin Emerging and Developing 
Countries 
 Emerging Economies Developing Countries 
Natural LYS HMR De jure Natural LYS HMR De jure 
Constant 0.16 
(7.18)* 
0.11 
(5.20)* 
0.20 
(4.88)* 
0.18 
(7.39)* 
0.23 
(5.556)* 
0.18 
(4.72)* 
0.06 
(2.89)* 
0.22 
(6.87)* 
Money 4.22e-05 
(1.16) 
3.93e-05 
(1.02) 
0.03 
(5.14)* 
4.75e-05 
(1.07) 
0.02 
(2.85)* 
0.01 
(4.17)* 
0.27 
(7.98)* 
0.02 
(3.33)* 
Real GDP -0.47 
(-3.06)* 
-0.39 
(-2.45)# 
-0.64 
(-3.10)* 
-0.51 
(-2.37)# 
-0.54 
(-3.23)* 
-0.27 
(-2.02)# 
-0.38 
(-2.45)# 
-0.57 
(-3.46)* 
Openness -0.11 
(-3.63)* 
-0.05 
(-1.96)^ 
-0.13 
(-4.19)* 
-0.11 
(-4.72)* 
-0.10 
(-4.09)* 
-0.09 
(-3.05)* 
0.04 
(1.07) 
-0.09 
(-4.15)* 
CB turnover 0.14 
(4.55)* 
0.17 
(6.156)* 
0.08 
(3.71)* 
0.18 
(5.53)* 
0.08 
(3.95)* 
0.10 
(4.11)* 
0.03 
(1.83)^ 
0.09 
(4.37)* 
TT growth 0.05 
(1.27) 
0.05 
(1.04) 
-0.03 
(-0.58) 
0.03 
(0.71) 
-0.03 
(-1.36) 
-0.003 
(-0.17) 
-0.08 
(-2.89)* 
-0.02 
(-1.07) 
Gov. balance 0.12 
(-0.88) 
-0.20 
(-1.09) 
-0.03 
(-0.14) 
-0.37 
(-2.51)# 
0.12 
(1.14) 
-0.08 
(-0.64) 
0.06 
(0.30) 
-0.01 
(-0.08) 
Floating 0.17 
(8.32)* 
0.03 
(2.08)3 
0.13 
(4.19)* 
0.04 
(0.99) 
0.08 
(4.16)* 
0.04 
(3.12)* 
0.01 
(0.09) 
0.03 
(2.60)* 
Intermediate 0.02 
(1.08) 
0.12 
(5.66)* 
0.04 
(2.18)# 
0.04 
(2.02)# 
-0.04 
(-1.63) 
0.081 
(4.64)* 
0.01 
(1.03) 
0.01 
(0.67) 
Observations 513 408 357 489 731 589 304 727 
F-test prob. 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Adj. R2 0.81 0.79 0.80 0.78 0.81 0.79 0.85 0.78 
Notes: The table reports the least squares dummy variables results of unbalanced panels with fixed 
effects. Dependent variable is inflation. The standard errors of the estimates are robust to cross 
contemporaneous correlation. t -statistics are displayed in parenthesis. (*) denotes significance at 
the 1% level, (#) at the 5% level and (^) at the 10% level. 
Source: Author's estimates. 
 
On the other hand, when the impact on inflation of our main variable of 
interest is analysed, we find that there are positive and significant associations 
between inflation and floating and intermediate exchange rate regimes in most 
classifications. In other words, fixed exchange rate regimes are associated with 
lower inflation rates, in contrast to floating and intermediate regimes. 
Particularly, in emerging and developing countries, the de facto floating regimes 
from natural classification show an inflation rate of 16.5% and 8.2% higher than 
under fixed regimes, respectively. Interestingly, in contrast to the results obtained 
for the world, emerging and developing samples, fixed regimes are associated 
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with higher inflation in advanced economies when we use the de jure 
classification 14 . De jure floating in advanced economies is associated with 
inflation rates that are 1.4% lower than under fixed regimes, while intermediate 
regimes are associated with higher inflation relative to fixed regimes (about 
2.3%). 
In addition, our results on intermediate regimes show that the inflation rate is 
higher in advanced countries using intermediate regimes, compared to those 
advanced economies using fixed and floating regimes. Conversely, the effects of 
intermediate regimes on inflation are weaker than the effects of floating regimes 
in emerging countries. In developing countries, intermediate arrangements 
display a lower impact on inflation than fixed and floating regimes but the 
coefficient is not significant. In Table 7 the performance of exchange rate regimes 
on inflation is reported. In most cases, inflation is lower if the regime is fixed. 
This finding is in line with De Grauwe & Schnabl (2005), Coudert & Dubert 
(2005), Bleaney & Francisco (2007) and Sosvilla-Rivero & Ramos-Herrera 
(2014), among others. 
 
Table 7. Exchange Rate Arrangements Performance on Inflation 
 Natural LYS HMR De Jure 
 
 
 
 
 
Ranking from the 
best to the worst 
performance 
All Countries 
Fixed 
Intermediate* 
Floating 
Fixed 
Floating 
Intermediate 
Fixed 
Intermediate 
Floating 
Fixed 
Floating* 
Intermediate 
Advanced Economies 
Floating* 
Fixed 
Intermediate* 
Fixed 
Floating* 
Intermediate 
Fixed 
Floating* 
Intermediate 
Floating 
Fixed 
Intermediate 
Emerging Economies 
Fixed 
Intermediate* 
Floating 
Fixed 
Floating 
Intermediate 
Fixed 
Intermediate 
Floating 
Fixed 
Intermediate 
Floating* 
Developing Countries 
Intermediate* 
Fixed 
Floating 
Fixed 
Floating 
Intermediate 
Fixed 
Floating* 
Intermediate* 
Fixed 
Intermediate 
Floating 
Note: (*) insignificant variables. 
Source: Author's calculations. 
 
Table 8. Inflation and Exchange Rate Arrangements in Developing Countries 
  
Gosh et al., 
(2002) 
Levy-Yeyati & 
Sturzenegger 
(2001) 
 
Hussain et 
al., (2005) 
 
Our results 
    Natural LYS HMR De Jure 
Period 1970-1999 1974-1999  1970-1999  1974-1999  1974-1999  1974-1999  1974-1999 
Observations 967 629  1401 731 589 304 727 
Method Pool Pool Pool LSDV LSDV LSDV LSDV 
Ranking Fixed Fixed Fixed Intermediate* Fixed Fixed Fixed 
 Intermediate Floating Intermediate* Fixed Floating Floating* Intermediate* 
 Floating Intermediate Floating Floating Intermediate Intermediate* Floating 
Note: The results by Husain et al., (2005) are based on their estimate with country fixed effects. (*) 
insignificant variables. 
Source: Gosh et. al., (2002), Levy-yeyati & Sturzenegger (2001), Husain et. al., (2005) and Author's 
calculations. 
 
Comparing our results for developing countries to earlier studies by Ghosh et. 
al., (1997, 2002), Levy-Yeyati & Sturzenegger (2001) and Husain et. al., (2005), 
we notice that they are largely similar. Ghosh et. al., (1997, 2002) find that, in the 
relatively low income per capita developing countries (based on the World Bank 
classification), inflation under a fixed exchange rate arrangement is significantly 
lower than under intermediate or floating exchange rate regimes in the period 
1970-1999. Similarly, Levy-Yeyati & Sturzenegger (2001) find that fixed 
 
14  Similarly, the natural classification shows a positive association between fixed regimes and 
inflation in advanced economies, but its coefficient is too low and not significant. 
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exchange rates are associated with lower inflation than floating or intermediate 
exchange rates in non-industrial countries (both emerging markets and 
developing countries), but, in contrast with Ghosh et al., (1997, 2002), floating 
arrangements are associated with lower inflation than intermediate ones (see 
Table 8). The results obtained by Husain et al., (2005) suggest that developing 
countries appear to benefit from fixed exchange rates because they deliver lower 
inflation than floating or intermediate regimes. When we use the de jure 
classification, our results are similar to Ghosh et al., (1997, 2002) and Husain et 
al., (2005), while our results using the LYS and HMR classifications are similar 
to Levy-Yeyati & Sturzenegger (2001)15.  
In summary, our results provide some support for the role of fixed exchange 
rate regimes as credibility enhancing stabilisation devices particularly in 
emerging and developing economies. The inflation results are quite robust to 
different exchange rate classifications. 
 
6. Concluding Remarks 
The academic debate on the most appropriate exchange rate regime for a 
country or group of countries has been one of the most controversial topics in 
theoretical and empirical literature. Notwithstanding its increasing relevance to 
policy, the literature offers relatively few empirical studies about the impact of 
the exchange rate regime on inflation performance in developed, emerging and 
developing countries, separately. This article has provided an empirical analysis 
of the impact of different exchange rate regimes on inflation in advanced, 
emerging and developing countries. To this end, we have attempted to make two 
contributions. Firstly, we distinguish between the de jure and the three de facto 
classifications systems. We have used the IMF de jure classification and checked 
the robustness of our results with three different de facto classifications: the LYS 
classification based on a clustered analysis, the natural classification based 
mainly on market determined dual and parallel exchange rates, and the HMR 
classification based on exchange rate regimes and taking into account external 
shocks and revaluations.  
Secondly, we have used a LSDV regression technique to study whether a 
particular exchange rate regime affects inflation performance. Our empirical 
findings indicate clear support for fixed regimes. They provide support for the 
role of fixed exchange rate regimes as a credible nominal anchor for the evolution 
of price levels, particularly in emerging and developing countries. Emerging and 
developing countries with a lower budget deficit, higher central bank 
independence, higher ratio of exports plus imports to GDP and fixed regimes 
show better inflation performance than others. Conversely, fixed regimes are 
associated with more inflation in advanced economies when we use the de jure 
classification only. Fixed exchange rate regimes are associated with lower 
inflation rates, particularly in emerging and developing countries. Developing 
countries using de jure floating exchange rate regimes show an inflation rate of 
2.9% higher than developing countries using de jure fixed regimes. 
In light of these results, it can be concluded that a fixed exchange rate 
arrangement is superior to another exchange rate regime in delivering better 
inflation performance, particularly in developing countries. The credibility 
associated with fixed exchange rates may play an important role in promoting 
financial stability since this regime can discipline policy-making and minimises 
discretion. An important part of literature considers adopting a foreign currency 
(dollarization) as the domestic currency to buy a credible policy of price stability, 
eliminating the role of short-run discretionary government policies that can give 
rise to policy inconsistencies.  
 
 
15 Our model was also applied to non-industrial countries (both emerging and developing) and the 
results are similar to those of developing countries. These results are available upon request. 
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